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T HE SEMANTIC REALISM /ANTI -REALISM D ISPUTE
1
AND K NOWLEDGE OF M EANINGS

ABSTRACT: Here the relationship between understanding and
knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the
semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would
undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments
for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency and conveyability of meaning are
distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much
is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for
rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends.
1. INTRODUCTION

The argument between semantic realism and anti-realism,2 according to Dummett and all those who follow him in this terminology, is

2

whether or not the meaning (or a central component of the meaning)
of a declarative, indexical-free sentence can be taken to be the conditions in which the sentence is true—where truth is understood as being
at least potentially verification-transcendent (i.e. correspondence to reality). The semantic realist answers the question affirmatively, whereas
the semantic anti-realist of the Dummettian type denies this.
Sometimes the anti-realists suggest that truth (taken as something
essentially verification-transcendent) cannot serve as the central notion of the theory of meaning and must be replaced by verifiability; at
times, it is rather suggested that truth itself must be understood in an
epistemically constrained way, and be equated with verifiability.3 Either
way, the question is whether the meaning of a sentence could consist
of, or determine, truth-conditions which can obtain independently of a
speaker’s ability to recognizing that they obtain or fail to obtain.
The juxtaposition of realism and anti-realism, however, typically
gets quickly reformulated, in the Dummettian literature, as the question of whether a competent speaker-hearer can know or grasp such
verification-transcendent truth-conditions or not4 —or, often (see e.g.
Miller (2003)), the contrast is formulated in this way from the beginning. I shall call this “epistemological” way of putting the difference between realism and anti-realism, in terms of what a competent
speaker-hearer knows or can know, “the second formulation”, and the
above, more “metaphysical” way, which only talks about what kind of
truth-conditions declarative sentences may or may not have, “the first
formulation” of the realism/anti-realism-opposition. And it is when
the matter is formulated in the second way that semantic realism may
begin to look problematic, as it seems to postulate for language-users
knowledge which they arguably cannot—according to Dummett and
his disciples—have.
But harmless as the move from the first formulation to the second
formulation may first look for many—it is often taken as a tautology
that understanding amounts to knowledge of meaning—it is my aim
in this brief note to argue that the two formulations are by no means
equivalent, and that the move from the former to the latter is in fact far
from harmless and changes dramatically the setting; the second formulation is highly misleading, for it presents us with a false dichotomy—
or so I will try to argue. In the course of this argument, some more
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general observations about knowledge of meaning also emerge.
2. DUMMETT’S MASTER ARGUMENT

Let us recall how the Dummettian argument undermining semantic
realism goes.5 We can split the argument into three parts (cf. Shieh
(1998b)):6
2.1.

The essential communicability of meaning argument

To begin with, Dummett submits that the meaning of a statement cannot be, or contain as an ingredient, anything which is not manifest in
the use made of it, lying solely in the mind of the individual who apprehends that meaning: if two individuals agree completely about the
use to be made of the statement, then they agree about its meaning.
Now there has been some unclarity, in the secondary literature,
about what more exactly counts as the same use (for example, it seems
to be a common misunderstanding that it would be just the same dispositions to assent and dissent, á la Quine). Fortunately, Sanford Shieh
(1998a) gives a careful analysis of the issue, and argues, convincingly
in my view, that for Dummett the sameness of use amounts to the
following: If two speakers agree in what they would count as justifications for a statement, then they attach the same meaning to it. In other
words, it should not be possible that two subjects would agree in what
they would count as justification for a statement but attach different
meanings to it (we’ll return to this point below).
In any case, Dummett then goes on to state that an individual cannot communicate what he cannot be observed to communicate: if one
individual associated with an expression some mental content, where
the association did not lie in the use he made of the expression, then
he could not convey that content by means of the symbol or formula,
for his audience would be unaware of the association and would have
no means of becoming aware of it.
2.2.

Argument for the implicitness of linguistic knowledge

Furthermore, Dummett argues that knowledge of meaning must be, in
the end, implicit.
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To be sure, Dummett grants that knowledge of the meaning of an
expression is frequently verbalizable knowledge, that is, knowledge
which consists in the ability to state the rules in accordance with which
the expression is used. However, Dummett adds, to suppose that, in
general, a knowledge of meaning consisted in verbalizable knowledge
would involve an infinite regress: if a grasp of the meaning of an expression consisted, in general, in the ability to state its meaning, then
it would be impossible for anyone to learn a language who was not
already equipped with a fairly extensive language. Hence, Dummett
concludes, that the knowledge which constitutes the understanding of
language must be implicit knowledge.
Implicit knowledge cannot, so the argument continues, meaningfully be ascribed to someone unless it is possible to say in what the
manifestation of that knowledge consists: there must be an observable
difference between the behavior or capacities of someone who is said
to have that knowledge and someone who is said to lack it; hence it
follows that a grasp of the meaning of a statement must, in general,
consist of a capacity to use that statement in a certain way.
2.3.

The argument against realist truth conditions

Finally, Dummett submits, it is quite obscure in what the knowledge
of the condition under which a sentence is true can consist, when that
condition is not one which is always capable of being recognized as obtaining; when a sentence is not “effectively decidable”7 , the condition
which must, in general, obtain for it to be true is not one which we are
capable of recognizing whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a
position to do so.
Hence any behavior which displays a capacity for acknowledging
the sentence as being true in all cases in which the condition for its
truth can be recognized as obtaining will fall short of being a full manifestation of the knowledge of the condition for its truth.
Sanford Shieh, in his valuable analysis of Dummett’s argument,
summarizes the challenge of semantic anti-realism thus: “the burden
of proof is on realism, to produce a satisfactory account of the concept
of knowing realist truth conditions” (Shieh 1998a, 659). Note, by the
way, that this presupposes what we have called “the second formulation”.
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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The details of all these steps can be, and have been, debated.8 But
let us, for the sake of the argument, grant (2) and (3), and focus on (1);
the argument from the essential communicability of meaning; that, in
any case, is what interests us here.
3.

TRANSPARENCY, COMMUNICABILITY AND CONVEYABILITY OF
MEANING

Both Dummett’s master argument and the move from the first to the
second formulation are essentially based on certain—no doubt widely
held—ideas concerning the knowability of meaning. Indeed, Dummett
has always pressed that meanings must be transparent for languageusers. He asserts, for example: “It is an undeniable feature of the
notion of meaning. . . that meaning is transparent in the sense that,
if someone attaches a meaning to each of two words, he must know
whether these meanings are the same.” [Dummett (1978), p. 131.]
However, it is not always clear how strongly such ideas are meant to
be interpreted.
Following Alexander George (1997), it is useful to distinguish various different though related theses concerning meaning here.9 Namely,
there are at least three different ideas, which one often tends to conflate, that are effective in such considerations; they are, from the
strongest to the weakest:
Conveyability: One can always establish which meaning a speaker has
associated with the expression of her language.
Equatability: If two people attach the same meaning to an expression,
then it is possible for one to ascertain this.
Differentiability: If two speakers associate different meanings with an
expression, then it is possible for one to determine this.
As was already suggested above, these are not clearly distinguished, in
the writings of Dummett and others, and one tends to slide from one
to another without noticing their differences. Nevertheless, these are
distinct theses, and it is at least in principle possible to hold a weaker
thesis without committing oneself to the stronger ones.
www.thebalticyearbook.org

The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings

6

Now as George concludes, though, it is only the last, weaker one
that is really required in the Dummettian argument in favour of antirealism; actually, this harmonizes also well with Shieh’s analysis above,
according to which the crucial issue, in Dummett’s argument, is that
if two speakers associate different meanings with a statement, then
there should be a difference in what they count as a justification for the
statement; and that difference ought to be manifestable. Nevertheless,
I shall argue below that even this weaker principle is—if not blatantly
indefensible—at least deniable.
4. HOW ABOUT SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM?

Nowadays increasingly many philosophers find the externalist arguments of Putnam and others compelling. However, these arguments
also entail that there is a definite sense in which we do not actually
know the meanings of many of our words (though it seems to me that
this is not always sufficiently well understood even by many of those
who are in principle sympathetic to the externalist arguments). That
is, although the idea that understanding just is knowledge of meaning
has played an essential role in much of the contemporary philosophy of
language, this picture (at least, if interpreted along the lines that Dummett and many others do) just cannot be correct, if the basic lesson of
semantic externalism is true.10
Certainly the most famous and influential argument for semantic externalism is Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment Putnam
(1975a). Let us briefly remind ourselves about its main lines: Imagine thus that somewhere, far, far away, there is a planet very much like
Earth; let us call it Twin Earth. There is intelligent life on the planet,
and languages similar to ours are spoken there. There is, however, a
peculiar difference between Earth and Twin Earth: the liquid called
‘water’ on Twin Earth is not H2 O but a totally different liquid whose
chemical formula is very long and complicated; we may abbreviate it
as XYZ. It is assumed that it is indistinguishable from water in normal
circumstances; it tastes like water and quenches thirst like water, lakes
and seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ, it rains XYZ there, etc. Next, imagine that we roll the time back to, say, 1750, when chemistry had not
been developed on either Earth or Twin Earth. At that time nobody in
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either linguistic community would have been able to differentiate between XYZ and H2O. Unless there has been a massive meaning change
in between (not a particularly attractive line to take11 ), the extension
of ‘water’ was just as much H2 O on Earth, and the extension of ‘water’
was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth.
However, one simply could not determine, on the basis of observable linguistic behaviour of the language-users in 1750, whether our
“water” and their “water” had the same meaning or not. The manifestable use of the two linguistic communities would be exactly the
same. So would any explicit verbalizable knowledge of meaning. Also,
consider a pair of statements in these two languages which contain
“water”, with all the other words really having the same meaning. Now
a speaker on Earth and on Twin Earth (in 1750, being ignorant of any
chemistry) would agree in what they would count as justifications for
such a statement: in part, that the stuff in question is clear, tasteless
and odorless liquid, quenches thirst, and whatever. Nevertheless, under the standard assumption that meaning determines extension12 —
that is, that if the extensions of two expressions differ, their meanings
cannot be the same—it is the case that our “water” and “water” in Twin
Earth differ in meaning.
This thought-experiment and its kin undermine the assumption of
the transparency of meaning, and the whole equation of competence
in a language with knowledge of its meanings (at least in the way that
the Dummettians understand it). Hence, if the argument is sound,
the step from the first formulation to the second formulation is also
unjustified.13
Even if the above point may have been left somewhat implicit in,
for example, Putnam’s seminal paper “Meaning of ‘meaning”’ Putnam
(1975a), Putnam has certainly made it explicit enough in some other
writings:
But, then, some have objected, it seems that I am saying
that we “didn’t know the meaning of the word ‘water”’ until
we developed modern chemistry.
This objection simply involves an equivocation on the phrase
“know the meaning”. To know the meaning of a word may
mean (a) to know how to translate it, or (b) to know what
it refers to, in the sense of having the ability to state exwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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plicitly what the denotation is (other than by using the
word itself), or (c) to have tacit knowledge of its meaning, in the sense of being able to use the word in discourse.
The only sense in which the average speaker of the language “knows the meaning” of most of his words is (c). In
that sense, it was true in 1750 that Earth English speakers
knew the meaning of the word “water” and it was true in
1750 that Twin Earth English speakers knew the meaning
of their word “water”. “Knowing the meaning” in this sense
isn’t literally knowing some fact. (Putnam 1988, 32)
Actually, already in another paper from the time of “Meaning of
‘meaning”’, Putnam wrote:
. . . a speaker may ‘have’ a word, in the sense of possessing normal ability to use it in discourse, and not know the
mechanism of reference of that word, explicitly or even
implicitly. ‘Knowing the meaning’ of a word in the sense
of being able to use it is implicitly knowing something;
but it isn’t knowing nearly as much as philosophers tend
to assume. I can know the meaning of the word ‘gold’
without knowing, explicitly or implicitly, the criteria for
being gold (contrary to John Locke), and without having
any very clear idea at all just how the word is tied to what
ever it is tied to. (Putnam 1975b, 278)
Another important figure in the externalist camp, Michael Devitt,
in turn puts the point thus:
It is natural (and correct) to think that, for the most part,
we ‘know what we mean’ by the words we use. However,
this expression should not mislead us to exaggerating, as
description theories do, the degree to which we are experts
on the semantics of our language, and in particular the
degree to which we are experts on what our terms refer
to; there is a sense in which we do not, for the most part,
know what we mean. (Devitt 1981, 20)
So, what more exactly is required for being a competent speaker
according to externalists? In what sense does she “know the meanings”
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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of her language? Unfortunately, the leading externalists do not say
much of anything positive about this; moreover, they give somewhat
conflicting answers.
To begin with, surely a person must have, in order to be competent
with a word, say, “water”, caught on to the syntactical role of the word;
the person must be able to combine “water” appropriately with other
words to form sentences. (Devitt (1981), p. 196; cf. Devitt (1983)).
Furthermore, to understand the English word “water”, to have the ability to successfully refer with it to water, is to be appropriately linked to
the network of causal chains for “water”, involving other people’s abilities as well as groundings and reference borrowings. The usage of our
speaker must be grounded in water (that is, H2 O). A Twin-Earthian,
who in other respects has the same ability with “water” that we do,
simply does not have our understanding of the word because his ability is grounded not in water but in apparently similar but really quite
different stuff. There is no way she could be competent with our word
“water” (see Devitt 1981, 1983).
How much more is required for competence? Here the opinions
begin to differ. Putnam famously introduced his idea of “stereotypes”.
These are sets of descriptions commonly associated with a word; for
example, the one associated with “water” might be along the lines
“clear, tasteless and odorless liquid which quenches thirst”, or something. Of course Putnam, as an externalist, does not claim that the
connection between a word and such its stereotype is analytic, or that
the stereotype correctly fixes the extension of the word. Nevertheless,
Putnam proposes that the stereotype is part of the meaning of the word,
and—what is essential here—that a person who does not know even
the relevant stereotype does not know the meaning of the word, and
consequently, would not succeed in referring with the word (Putnam
1975a).
Devitt, on the other hand, begs to differ; and I am inclined to agree
here. Consider, for example, “echidna”. Devitt admits that he used to
know next to nothing about echidnas; that is, he did not know even
the stereotype for “echidna”—whatever that might be. Yet, given his
place in the causal network for “echidna”, there seems to be no reason
to deny that he could make true or false statements about echidnas,
ask questions about them, give orders about them, and so forth, all

the time using “echidna”; that is, he could still successfully refer to
echidnas. (Devitt 1981, 196).
Now it is certainly possible to continue to use the talk of “knowledge of meanings” while accepting the moral of the externalist
arguments—as some philosophers have indeed done. Obviously this is
more a matter of words. What is important is to keep in mind just how
different this understanding of “the knowledge of meaning” is from the
more traditional (and that of Dummett, in particular) way of cashing
out this phrase. According to the latter picture, a competent speaker,
to be able to successfully refer with a word, must know the meaning in
the sense of either knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions for
belonging to the extension of the word,14 or being able to recognize
reliably whether something really is in the extension of the word or
not. And it is this picture that is at issue now, and the one that externalism rebuts. In the move from the first to the second formulation,
and in the second formulation and the Dummettian master argument
in particular, “knowledge of meanings” is understood by Dummett and
other in this specific, rather literal way. And that is what has been our
target here.

www.thebalticyearbook.org

5. CONCLUSIONS

From the externalist perspective, the whole second way of framing the
difference between semantic realism and anti-realism is based on a
false dichotomy: it is perfectly coherent to hold both that the truthconditions of a sentence may be verification-transcendent and that
speakers may not know them (in the sense relevant here). For this
reason, realism in the first formulation and realism in the second formulation are by no means the same view: it is possible to advocate
realism in the first sense, and simultaneously deny realism in the second sense.
Note, however, that my main point here is not to argue for the correctness of externalism, but simply to point out that the quite standard
move from the first formulation to the second formulation of the juxtaposition of realism and anti-realism suggests a highly distorted picture
of the field, and ignores—more or less by definition—one influential
option from among the theories of meaning. Perhaps, at the end of the
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day, externalism can not be defended (though I, for one, am quite confident about its defensibility). But still, this is something that requires
some substantial philosophical argumentation, and cannot be ruled out
by convention.

and the Dummettian anti-realist approach can be both accepted coherently; I must say I
don’t have the faintest idea how this could be done, and they don’t give even a slightest
hint.
11
For if one begins to assume that there is a change in the meaning of a term whenever
the beliefs associated with the term change, one is dangerously sliding towards radical
meaning variance, incommensurability and conceptual relativism á la Kuhn and Feyerabend. And anyone with even a modest faith in the rationality of science should not start
going that way. (In fact, Dummett, at least in one passage Dummett (1974), suggests
exactly this strategy as a response to the externalist arguments. We can only guess that
he had not really thought the idea through carefully.)
12
There are now some (see e.g. Crane (2001); Farkas (2006), 2008) who suggest
that, instead of accepting externalism, we should give up this assumption. I personally
have serious doubts about this strategy, but here it is sufficient to note that in any case,
this line is not open for Dummett and his followers; they are deeply committed to this
traditional Fregean assumption.
13
In fact, I would further argue that such considerations also undermine the key
premise (“linguistic behaviorism”) of both Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis
and Davidson’s whole semantic program, but going there in detail would be too much
a digression. For more about Quine’s case, see my (Raatikainen, 2005). For Davidson,
suffice it to say that he totally agrees with Quine about the fundamental premise here.
14
Or, perhaps, in the spirit of the later cluster description theory (Searle, Strawson
etc.), some appropriate cluster of descriptions such that an object belongs to the extension of the word if and only if it satisfies most of these descriptions. Such a modification,
though results a more plausible view, would not help here.

Notes
1
I am grateful to Barry Smith and Guy Longworth for their comments on the talk in
Riga, and to Douglas Patterson for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2

There has been some dispute about the relationship of the semantic realismantirealism issue to the more traditional metaphysical question of realism; see e.g. Devitt
(1983), George (1984), Miller (2003), Putnam (2007), Devitt (2010). I think this unclarity goes back to Dummett himself: sometimes Dummett suggests that the metaphysical
views of realism and idealism are only two unclear metaphors (see e.g. the introduction
to Dummett (1978)) which cannot be rationally argued for or against, but must be replaced with the Dummettian semantic setting (see also Devitt (1983)). In other places,
however, Dummett seems to apply this “metaphor thesis” more specifically to mathematical objects, and leave open the possibility that the metaphysical question might be
perfectly meaningful in the case of, for example, external physical objects. And in still
other occasions, Dummett rather seems to admit that the metaphysical realism question
(even in the case of mathematical objects) and the semantic realism/anti-realism question are simply two independent and equally meaningful questions (see e.g. Dummett
(1992)).
3
For a detailed critical discussion of such epistemological theories of truth, in the
context of the philosophy of mathematics (that is, the intuitionistic views of truth), and
Dummett’s attempts of explication in particular there, see Raatikainen (2005).
4
See e.g. the very first paragraph of Dummett (1969).
5
Perhaps the most detailed presentation of the argument is in Dummett (1975); see
also Dummett (1969). The argument appears in a number of articles collected in Dummett (1978) and Dummett (1993); see also Shieh (1998a).
6
My understanding of Dummett’s argument has been greatly aided by Shieh (1998a).
7
What, more exactly, “undecidable” could mean in Dummett is in fact quite elusive;
see Shieh (1998b). Very roughly, a statement is undecidable if we don’t know whether
we can verify it, and we also don’t know whether we can falsify it.
8
See e.g. Devitt (1983); Miller (2003).
9
A larger part of George’s paper is devoted to the exegetical question whether Frege
really subscribed any or all these theses. The perceptive distinctions George presents are,
though, very interesting in themselves, quite independently of this question.
10
I am, of course, not at all the first one to suggest this kind of line. Perhaps the first
to use explicitly externalist views against the Dummettian arguments was Millar (1977);
see also McGinn (1982), Currie & Eggenberger (1983), Devitt (1983), Gamble (2003).
Actually Dummett himself seems to have, early on (see e.g. Dummett (1974)), admitted
that if the externalist view on meaning is correct, his own view must be wrong. Both
Wright (1986) and Green (2001), in contrast, suggest that the externalist conclusions
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